In what follows, I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism, TM below, to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes:
S arises not from the fact that S lacks a ground, but from the fact that the grounding status of S is undecidable. That would mean that even a perfect representation of reality would neither represent S as grounded nor represent S as ungrounded. This, indeed, is what I argue is the case. Ground-unspecifiable sentences are undecidable as to whether they have grounds or not. We cannot then affirm that they are ungrounded.
In what follows I first present the case for ground-unspecifiable sentences being ungrounded. I will then show how the case is flawed, and demonstrate why we have to accept undecidability.
2.
It seems plausible to think along the following lines. The only way a sentence S can be grounded is if there is a sentence R referentially downstream from S that describes a nonalethic condition. (That's how S gets hooked onto non-alethic reality.) Contraposing then we ought to accept: would require uncovering a sentence R referentially downstream from (0) describing a nonalethic-condition. So (0)'s status is undecidable.
It follows that G-principle cannot be affirmed. Indeed, it's undecidable since there are sentences S, with no sentences R downstream from them describing non-alethic conditions, whose grounding status is undecidable. Since H-principle is equivalent to G-principle, the former must undecidable also. The Kripke-style argument then fails.
We have been looking at sentences like Regress (0) whose ground-unspecifiability arises from infinitely descending referential chains. But, we can apply the infinite deferment argument for undecidability to sentences whose ground-unspecifiability arises through looping, the simplest form of which is T. Implicit in T's self-reference is an infinite series of interpretative stages. We can partially express this as follows:
T refers to a sentence that says T is true, which refers to a sentence that says T is true, which refers to a sentence that says T is true, ad infinitum.
At each stage we ascertain a content: T is true. This content describes an alethic condition, that a sentence T is true. So, at each stage, no grounding condition is specified. But there is always a further interpretative stage after any given stage. This shows that T, due to its selfreference, is referentially down stream from itself. Using G-principle and H-principle, we might attempt, again to show that T must be ungrounded. But again, for exactly the same reasons we can show these arguments are flawed. The fact that there is no sentence downstream from T describing a non-alethic condition cannot be a reason for claiming that T fails to be grounded, since T as each interpretive stage transfers responsibility for fixation of grounding onto T at the next stage.
Since T at no stage can be held up as the source of T's failing to be grounded, we cannot say that T is ungrounded on the basis that no sentence at any interpretive stage describes a nonalethic condition.
In short, whether sentence S's ground-unspecifiability comes through infinite descent or looping we can argue for the same conclusion: it's undecidable whether S is grounded or not. Undecidability here just means unassertable in principle. This unassertability is not due to epistemic limitation or verification transcendent fact. It means that a perfect representation of reality would neither assign such sentences the status grounded nor ungrounded.
3. Ground-unspecifiable sentences are undecidable with respect to their grounding status.
Given TM-which says that all alethic properties must be grounded-it follows that such sentences are undecidable with respect to their alethic properties. For example, it's undecidable whether (0) in Regress is either true or false, lacks truth and falsity, is both true and false, and so on. Each alethic property, given TM, requires a non-alethic truth-or falsemaker. But none can be assigned to (0). Call this undecidability with respect to alethic properties alethic-undecidability or A undecidability for short.
As we noted, the class of ground-unspecifiable sentences includes those sentences that are the alethic paradoxes, the simplest, and best known of which, are the Liars, sentences such as L above. So, given TM, it's undecidable whether L is true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false. In particular, it's undecidable whether L is both true or false. It's not denied, but it's not affirmed either. To be both true and false, by TM, L would have to have both a truth-maker and a falsity-maker, but it's undecidable that it has either.
That's the essence of the alethic undecidability solution-AUS. 3 AUS uses TM to derive the conclusion that L is A undecidable. What, however, of the derivation of a contradiction from L via the T-schema? To so derive a contradiction, we need to be able to affirm the biconditional T L below: Consider now Curry's paradox:
C : If C is true, then God exists Given a supposition that C is true, we can easily prove that God exists, and so, by conditional introduction, prove C, and thus that C is true, and thus that God exists by modus ponens.
How does AUS deal with this? The sentence C is true is a ground-unspecifiable sentence. It's ground-unspecifiable because C is. C is ground-unspecifiable because of its reflexive referential properties. As noted above, we should not allow proofs with ground-unspecifiable sentences. So, the right response to the Curry is just to refrain from the initial step of the proof, which is to suppose that C is true. The proof then is blocked.
AUS also explains what's going on in open pair sentences such as:
O 2 : O 1 is not true.
We can assign O 1 truth and O 2 falsity (or neither-true-nor-false), or O 1 falsity (or neithertrue-nor-false) and O 2 truth, but we cannot assign the pair identical truth-values. The problem is that the sentences are semantically identical, and so should get the same truth-values. 6 In contrast to approaches that assign truth-values, AUS has no difficulties at all with open pairs.
It gives a perfectly symmetrical and principled analysis. Each member of the pair is A undecidable for exactly the same reasons. Each is ground-unspecifiable. So, AUS gives us symmetry and consistency.
5. It seems that AUS might have a general solution on offer to the semantic paradoxes.
However, every solution to the semantic paradoxes must confront the challenge of revenge.
5 It's simple to see how AUS applies to Yablo's (1993) paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences each one saying that all below it are untrue will be such that all sentences are ground- The fact that we do not affirm these sentences is the result of the fact that we cannot affirm
